Abstract. The mean-variance approach is an influential theory of decision under risk proposed by Markowitz (1952) . Unfortunately, the mean-variance approach 
The model (1)-(3) has an intuitive economic interpretation. The quantity r(L) captures the utility dispersion of a lottery L. In particular, r(L)=0 when L is a degenerate lottery that yields one outcome for certain (i.e., L bears no risk) or when an individual is indifferent between all outcomes in L that have a strictly positive probability of occurrence (i.e., L has de facto no risk exposure). For all other lotteries, the quantity r (L) is strictly positive. The quantity r (L) is related to risk measures commonly used in engineering and finance.
If the quantity r (L) measures the utility dispersion of a lottery L then it is natural to think that the coefficient ρ ∈[-1,1] captures an individual attitude towards the utility dispersion. A positive value of ρ∈(0,1] denotes an aversion to the utility dispersion. In this case, the representation (1) is simply a linear trade-off between expected utility and the utility dispersion. An individual prefers lotteries with a higher expected utility and a lower utility dispersion. An individual with a negative value of ρ∈ [-1,0) likes the utility dispersion. In this case, there is no trade-off: an individual prefers lotteries with a higher expected utility and a higher utility dispersion. In the special case when ρ=0 an individual does not care about the utility dispersion and acts as a neoclassical expected utility maximizer.
The model (1)- (3) is consistent with several behavioral regularities when a coefficient ρ is positive (cf. Table 1 below). This is in line with an economic intuition behind the model. Many behavioral regularities can be driven by a simple fact that people do not only seek to maximize their expected utility but they are also exhibiting an aversion to the utility dispersion. Table 1 Necessary conditions in model (1)-(3) for various behavioral regularities
The model presented in this paper differs from the mean-variance approach in two aspects. First, the mean-variance approach lacks an axiomatic foundation. It uses an ad hoc risk measure (variance or standard deviation) that violates the first-order stochastic dominance (e.g., Borch, 1969) . In contrast, the model presented in this paper is derived from four basic assumptions about individual preferences. This imposes a good deal of rational structure on the derived representation. In particular, the proposed model always respects the first-order stochastic dominance.
Second, the mean-variance approach does not have the concept of utility, i.e., the risk of a lottery is an objective characteristic. In contrast, the representation (1) has a subjective utility function. In this model, people care about a subjective utility dispersion not an objective risk, i.e. two individuals may disagree on the riskiness of the same lottery.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a formal framework, four proposed axioms and the representation theorem. Section 2 goes over behavioral implications of this model. Section 3 concludes with a general discussion.
Theory
Let X be a finite non-empty set of possible outcomes (consequences).
The set X is an abstract set, not necessarily a subset of the Euclidian space ℝ n .
A lottery L: X → [0,1] is a probability distribution on X, i.e., L(x)∈[0,1] for all x∈X and ∑x∈X L(x)=1. For simplicity, a degenerate lottery that yields one outcome x∈X with probability one is denoted by x. The set of all lotteries is denoted by ℒ. The notation LαL' denotes a compound lottery that yields a lottery L with probability α∈[0,1] and a lottery L' with probability 1-α.
A decision maker has a preference relation ≿ on ℒ. As usual, the symbol ≻ denotes the asymmetric component of ≿ and the symbol ~ denotes the symmetric component of ≿. We assume that the preference relation ≿ satisfies the following three axioms. Since the set of lottery outcomes X is assumed to be finite and the preference relation ≿ on X is complete and transitive (Axioms 1 and 2), there must be the most preferred outcome x∈X (i.e., x̄ ≿x for any x∈X ) and the least preferred outcome x̱ ∈X (i.e., x ≿x̱ for any x∈X ). Furthermore, since the preference relation ≿ is continuous (Axiom 3), for any outcome x∈X, there is a probability equivalent αx∈[0,1] such that x ~ xᾱxx̱ .
Before presenting the fourth and final assumption about individual preferences, it is necessary to introduce a new concept of a transformed lottery.
If lottery L is a degenerate lottery that yields one outcome for certain then the transformed lottery of L is the same degenerate lottery L. If lottery L is a binary lottery that yields either an outcome x∈X or an outcome y∈X, x≿y; then the
Finally, if lottery L yields more than two outcomes, its transformed lottery is defined as follows.
Definition 1 The transformed lottery L ρ of a lottery L∈ℒ is defined as
for any x∈X such that x ≿z (4)
for any x∈X such that z ≻x, where ρ ∈[-1,1] is a constant and z ∈X denotes the least preferred outcome
If ρ ∈[-1,1] then the transformed lottery Lρ is a well-defined probability distribution on X (i.e., Lρ ∈ℒ) for any lottery L∈ℒ. Note that the transformed lottery L ρ is identical to the original lottery L only in two cases: when L is a degenerate lottery that yields one outcome for certain and when ρ=0. When ρ∈(0,1] the transformation works as follows. The probability of any desirable outcome is decreased. In percentage terms, this decrease is proportionate to the cumulative probability of all undesirable outcomes in the original lottery L.
The probability of any undesirable outcome is increased. In percentage terms, this increase is proportionate to the cumulative probability of all desirable outcomes in the original lottery L. When ρ∈[-1,0) the probability of any desirable outcome is increased and the probability of any undesirable outcome is decreased during the transformation.
Which outcome is desirable or undesirable depends on a lottery. This lottery-dependent desirability of outcomes is closely related to the elation/ disappointment decomposition in disappointment aversion theory (cf. Gul, 1991, p. 671) . We use the probability equivalent αx scaled down by a factor of [1-ρ·(1-αx)] as a measure of "goodness" of outcome x∈X. Table 2 Risk measure r (L) is related to the engineering concept of risk. In many hazardous industries risk is defined as the probability of an accident times losses per accident. If "an accident" is a situation when an ex post outcome of a lottery brings a lower utility compared to an ex ante expectation (i.e., expected utility), we immediately obtain formula (6). Risk is measured by expected utility deviations below the expected utility of a lottery.
Risk measure r (L) is also related to the financial concept of risk. In finance, risk is defined as the expected volatility of asset returns. If expected volatility is captured through the mean absolute deviation, we end up with formula (7). Risk is nothing but the average absolute semideviation of a lottery (measured on the utility scale). 
Obviously, if ρ >1 then it is always possible to find probability α sufficiently close to zero (specifically, α < 1-1/ρ ) such that the inequality (8) is satisfied and a decision maker violates the first-order stochastic dominance.
On the other hand, if x ≿y then the lottery x stochastically dominates the lottery xαy for any α∈[0,1). A decision maker prefers xαy over x if
If ρ <-1 then it is always possible to find probability α sufficiently close to zero (specifically, α < 1+1/ρ ) such that the inequality (9) is satisfied and a decision maker violates the first-order stochastic dominance. 
At the same time, this individual prefers x[αβ]z to yαz for some α <1 if
If an individual cares only about the maximization of expected utility, i.e., when coefficient ρ is zero, right hand sides of inequalities (10) and (11) are the same. In this case, there can be no systematic common ratio effect.
If ρ ∈(0,1) then the right hand side of inequality (11) is always strictly greater than the right hand side of inequality (10) for all α <1. In this case it is possible to observe a systematic common ratio effect. This result is quite intuitive. When α =1 an individual chooses between a degenerate lottery y and a binary lottery xβz. An individual averse to the utility dispersion (for whom ρ > 0) may prefer the riskless lottery y over the risky lottery xβz, even if the latter yields a slightly higher expected utility. When α approaches zero both lotteries bring some utility dispersion and the lottery yαz loses its comparative advantage over the lottery x[αβ]z.
The Common Consequence Effect (the Allais Paradox)
Let L denote a lottery that yields outcome x with probability β, outcome y with probability 1-α and outcome z with probability α -β, for some α, β∈ (0,1) such that α >β and x,y,z∈X such that x ≻y ≻z. The common consequence effect occurs when an individual prefers a degenerate lottery y over lottery L but prefers lottery xβz over lottery yαz. The Allais paradox is a famous example of the common consequence effect (Allais, 1953) .
According to representation (1), a decision maker prefers lottery xβz over lottery yαz if the following inequality is satisfied:
For any ρ ≥0, the right hand side of (12) is less than or equal to the ratio β/α. Hence, inequality (12) may hold only if its left hand side is less than or equal to the ratio β/α. The latter condition is equivalent to u(y) ≤ u(L). Given this necessary inequality, an individual prefers lottery y over lottery L if
If a decision maker does not care about utility dispersion, i.e., when a coefficient ρ is zero, the right hand side in both inequalities (12) and (13) is equal to β/α. In this case, there can be no systematic common consequence effect. If a decision maker is averse to utility dispersion, i.e., when a coefficient ρ is strictly positive, the right hand side of inequality (12) is strictly greater than the right hand side of inequality (13) because α>β. In this case, inequalities (12) and (13) may hold simultaneously as strict inequalities. In other words, an individual may reveal a systematic common consequence effect.
The intuition behind the common consequence effect is simple. An individual averse to utility dispersion may prefer a riskless lottery y over a risky lottery L even if the latter yields a slightly higher expected utility. Now take lotteries y and L and shift the same probability mass 1-α from outcome y to outcome z in both lotteries. This creates a new pair of lotteries yαz and xβz such that the second lottery still has a slightly higher expected utility compared to the first lottery. However, both lotteries yαz and xβz are risky. In other words, the first lottery no longer has a clear comparative advantage over the first lottery, when it comes to utility dispersion. Hence, an individual may prefer y over L and xβz over yαz.
Vertical Fanning-In
Let L´ denote a lottery that yields outcome x with probability β-α, outcome y with probability α and outcome z with probability 1-β, for some α,β∈(0,1) such that β >α and x,y,z∈X such that x ≻y ≻z. A decision maker reveals vertical fanning-in when she prefers a degenerate lottery y to lottery L´ but prefers lottery xβz over lottery xαy. This behavioral pattern is called vertical fanning-in because the map of implied indifference curves plotted in the Marschak-Machina probability triangle exhibits a fanning-in pattern along the vertical axis. According to our model, an individual prefers xβz over xαy if
The right hand side of (14) is greater than or equal to the ratio (1-β)/(1-α) for all ρ ≥0 because β >α. Therefore, inequality (14) may hold only if its left hand side is greater than or equal to the ratio (1-β)/(1-α). The latter condition is equivalent to u(y) ≤ u(L´). Given this necessary inequality, an individual prefers lottery y over lottery L´ if
If an individual does not take utility dispersion into consideration (i.e., ρ=0) the right hand side in inequality (14) is the same as in inequality (15). In this case, there can be no systematic vertical fanning-in. If an individual is averse to utility dispersion (i.e., ρ>0) the right hand side in inequality (15) is always strictly greater than the right hand side in inequality (14) . In this case, inequalities (14) and (15) may both hold as strict inequalities, i.e., an individual may reveal systematic vertical fanning-in.
The intuition behind vertical fanning-in is similar to the intuition for the common consequence effect. A decision maker who is averse to utility dispersion may prefer a riskless lottery y over a risky lottery L´ even if the latter yields a slightly higher expected utility. We can obtain lotteries xαy and xβz by shifting probability mass α from outcome y to outcome x in lotteries y and L´. Therefore, if lottery L´ has a slight expected utility advantage over a degenerate lottery y then lottery xβz has the same expected utility advantage over lottery xαy. However, both lotteries xαy and xβz are risky, i.e., lottery xαy does not have a clear advantage over xβz in terms of utility dispersion. Thus, it is entirely possible for an individual who is averse to utility dispersion to prefer y over L´ (on the grounds that y brings no utility dispersion) and xβz over xαy (on the grounds that xβz yields a higher utility).
Violations of the Betweenness Property
According to the betweenness axiom, if a decision maker is indifferent between two lotteries then any probability mixture of these two lotteries is equally good. Despite its normative appeal, the betweenness property is often violated (cf. Camerer and Ho, 1994) . The model presented in this paper does not imply the betweenness property. According to our model, an individual is indifferent between L and L´ if
This individual is also indifferent between a probability mixture LαL´ and L if
If an individual does not care about utility dispersion (i.e., ρ=0), the equation (16) implies that lotteries L and L´ have the same expected utility, in which case the equation (17) is always satisfied. This is a standard result: an expected utility maximizer never violates the betweenness axiom. If an individual takes the utility dispersion into account (i.e., ρ≠0) and the equation (16) When lottery L is played two times in a row, the expected utility is 100 but the utility dispersion still remains 75. Now even an individual who is most averse to utility dispersion (i.e., with ρ=1) is willing to play the bet. Thus, our model can rationalize Samuelson's example (without evoking any additional assumptions such as loss aversion).
Conclusion
Many non-expected utility theories postulate that the utility of a binary lottery xαy is given by the following formula: For example, in expected utility theory w (α)=α ; in the disappointment aversion theory w (α)=α/[1+(1-α)·β], where β>-1 is a constant (e.g., Gul, 1991) ; in rank-dependent utility theory w (.) is an arbitrary subadditive function (e.g., Quiggin, 1981) , and etc. The model presented in this paper also fits into formula (19) with a function w (α)=α -ρ·α·(1-α ).
" shows that the model presented in this paper is not radically different from the existing decision theories, at least, when it comes to binary lotteries. However, crucial differences are already apparent when we consider lotteries with three outcomes. The latter case is typically visualized in the Marschak-Machina probability triangle (e.g., Machina, 1982) .
The set of all lotteries with up to three outcomes is depicted as an isosceles right triangle with the side length of one. The vertical (horizontal) side of the triangle shows the probability of the best (worst) outcome.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] Dashed lines on Figure 1 illustrate the indifference curves of an expected utility maximizer (for whom ρ =0). These curves are parallel straight lines. Solid lines on Figure 1 show the indifference curves of an individual who is averse to the utility dispersion (for whom ρ >0). These curves are convex in the south-east part of the triangle (below line OA) and concave in the northwest part of the triangle (above line OA).
Notably, an indifference curve BC is S-shaped. It is convex in the vicinity of point B and concave-in the vicinity of point C. Such S-shaped indifference curves were discovered in experimental studies (e.g., Bernasconi, 1994) but few decision theories can generate such curves. In fact, beside the model presented in this paper, there are only two theories able to do this job-rank-dependent utility theory and the perceived relative argument model of Loomes (2008) . Axiom 1 (completeness) implies that every α∈[0,1] belongs to at least one of these two sets. The two sets are both non-empty (α=1 belongs to the first set and α=0 belongs to the second set) and [0,1] is connected. Hence, there is at least one probability αL∈[0,1] that belongs to both sets, i.e. L ~ xᾱLx̱ .
Suppose that for some lottery L ∈ ℒ we have two such probability equivalents: L ~ xᾱLx̱ and L ~ xβLx̱ , where αL≠βL. Axiom 2 (transitivity) implies that if L ~ xᾱLx̱ and L ~ xβLx̱ then xᾱLx̱ ~ xβLx̱ . However, if αL≠βL then we must have either xᾱLx̱ ≻ xβLx̱ (when αL>βL) or xβLx̱ ≻ xᾱLx̱ (when βL>αL) because we already established that xᾱx̱ ≻xβx̱ for any α>β. Hence, we arrived at a contradiction and it must be the case that αL=βL. In other words, for any lottery L ∈ ℒ there is a unique probability equivalent αL∈[0,1] such that L~xᾱLx̱ .
Function V(L)=αL for all L ∈ ℒ represents the preference relation ≿. 
